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WHAT IS TO BE DONE ABOUT RESOURCE NATIONALISM?: THE 
CASE OF OYU TOLGOI 
Batkhuu Dashnyam* 
Foreign mining is as important now as ever. As the global population 
has continued to increase, so has the demand for natural resources. 
Developing countries richly endowed with natural resources have begun to 
realize that harnessing them presents a rare opportunity to fuel broader 
socioeconomic change and may, potentially, catalyze wholesale 
transformation.1 In this vein, countries have begun to increase their taxes and 
royalties on mining;2 and, to a greater extent, a “more indirect or insidious 
form of government intervention referred to as ‘creeping expropriation’”3 has 
begun to appear, whereby a “foreign investor is substantially deprived of the 
use or benefit of their investment even though formal title may continue to 
vest.”4 
This emerging tension is encapsulated in what is known as “resource 
nationalism.” In essence, resource nationalism broadly refers to 
governmental “dissatisfaction about the distribution of revenues from mining 
between company shareholders and the host nation.”5 Even after agreeing 
with foreign investors about the rights, royalties, taxes, and terms for a 
mining project, governments subsequently will attempt to renegotiate or even 
possibly breach their bargain in an effort to extract more control and 
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1 Marc Frilet & Ken Haddow, Guiding Principles for Durable Mining Agreements in Large Mining 
Projects, 31 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 467, 469 (2013). 
2 Terrence Edwards, Mongolia Must Accept Blame Over Rio Tinto Mine Dispute—PM, REUTERS 
(Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/mongolia-oyutolgoi-idUSL3N0X01NK20150403. 
3 Nader Mousavizadeh et al., Resource Nationalism, WILLIS MINING MKT. REV., Spring 2013, at 
7. 
4 Id. 
5 David Humphreys, Transatlantic Mining Corporations in the Age of Resource Nationalism, 
TRANSATLANTIC ACAD. PAPER SERIES, May 2012, at 10. 
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revenue.6 As a result, foreign investors now face substantial uncertainty and 
risk when they enter into mining arrangements with sovereign countries.7 
The Oyu Tolgoi mine, within Mongolia, provides a case study in 
resource nationalism. As one of the world’s largest copper-gold mines,8 Oyu 
Tolgoi has the potential to comprise approximately 3% of the world’s total 
copper output, and 34% of Mongolia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).9 In 
2009, Turquoise Hill Resources and Rio Tinto signed a long-term, 
comprehensive Investment Agreement with the government of Mongolia for 
the construction and operation of the Oyu Tolgoi copper-gold mining 
complex.10 The Agreement created a partnership between the Mongolian 
government—which acquired a 34%11 interest in the project—and Turquoise 
Hill Resources, which retained a controlling 66% interest in Oyu Tolgoi;12 
global miner, Rio Tinto, subsequently joined Turquoise Hill Resources as a 
strategic partner to manage the development of Oyu Tolgoi.13 
Since 2009, Oyu Tolgoi has been plagued with delays, disputes, and 
disappointment. For almost two years, the second phase of the project was 
suspended after complaints of cost overruns and a dispute over taxes.14 
                                                                                                                           
 
6 Id. at 10–12, 14. 
7 Id. 
8 Susan Wacaster, The Mineral Industry of Mongolia, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. 2012 MIN. Y.B. 
MONG., at 17.1 (2012) (copper deposits are considered strategic deposits in Mongolia as they have the 
potential to affect national security, and national and regional economic and social development. They 
also have the potential to account for greater than 5% of the total GDP in any given year. Mineral resources 
in Mongolia are the property of the state). 
9 Suleman Khan, Minegolia: The Resource Curse, BERKELEY POL. REV. (Oct. 22, 2014), 
https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2014/10/22/minegolia-the-resource-curse/. 
10 About the Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement, OYU TOLGOI 1, 1 (2009), http://ot.mn/media/ot/ 
content/about_us/IA/Brochure_About_the_OT_IA_EN.pdf [hereinafter INVESTMENT AGREEMENT 
SUMMARY]. 
11 Mongolia: Mining and Metals Tax Guide, ERNST & YOUNG, 1, 6 (2015), http://www.ey.com/ 
Publication/vwLUAssetsPI/tax-guide-mongolia-june-2015/$FILE/ey-tax-guide-mongolia-june-2015.pdf 
(under the mineral law of Mongolia, in the case of state-funded exploration for proven reserves at a deposit 
of strategic importance, the state may have a joint participation of up to 50% in a venture with a private 
legal person to exploit the mineral deposit. Where proven reserves in a strategic deposit have been 
determined through funding sources other than the state, the state may own up to 34% of the shares of an 
investment to be made by the license holder. In the current case, the proven reserves were determined by 
Ivanhoe Mines; thus, the Mongolian state currently owns a 34% stake). 
12 About the Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement, supra note 10, at 2. 
13 Oyu Tolgoi, RIO TINTO, http://www.riotinto.com/copperanddiamonds/oyu-tolgoi-4025.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2016). 
14 Edwards, supra note 2. 
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“Mongolia passed a series of laws and regulations designed to raise tax 
revenue and impose greater domestic control over ‘strategic’ mining 
assets,”15 while members of Parliament sought to renegotiate the terms of the 
original agreement.16 Even as the Mongolian government has sought to end 
the disputes with Rio Tinto and to restore Mongolia’s foreign-investor 
appeal, the Mongolian public remains wary of such negotiations; concerns 
about foreign investors, environmental damage, and the equitable 
distribution of mineral wealth linger.17 
This Note examines how resource nationalism can hamper foreign 
mining agreements. Part I examines the problem of resource nationalism, 
which is a pervasive phenomenon among numerous countries in Europe, 
Asia, and throughout the world, and then examines the Public Private 
Partnership (PPP)—an alternative, and potentially promising, way to 
structure mining projects that have worked extremely well within the United 
Kingdom and Chile. Part II then delineates the Oyu Tolgoi mine as a case 
study of how ill-structured investment agreements and joint ventures can 
generate negative environmental, social, economic, and corrupt effects. Part 
III demonstrates how the government of Mongolia could have structured the 
original investment agreement under a PPP construct, that not only would 
have thwarted the problem of resource nationalism, but also would have 
maximized benefits for the nation as a whole. 
I. RESOURCE NATIONALISM 
Resource nationalism takes many forms. At its core, it is described as 
“an expression of dissatisfaction about the distribution of revenues from 
mining between company shareholders and the host nation.”18 Countries 
including Chile, Peru, Zambia, Ghana, Russia, Poland, China, and India have 
increased their taxes and royalties on mining in recent years.19 “Increasingly, 
a more indirect or insidious form of government intervention referred to as 
                                                                                                                           
 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Agence France-Presse, Rio Tinto and Mongolia Sign Multibillion Dollar Deal on Mine 
Expansion, THE GUARDIAN (May 19, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/global/2015/may/19/rio-tinto-
and-mongolia-sign-multibillion-dollar-deal-on-mine-expansion. 
18 Humphreys, supra note 5. 
19 Id. 
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‘creeping expropriation’” has come to the forefront.20 Although the foreign 
investor holds the formal title, she is deprived of the use or benefit of the 
investment:21 
Whilst resource nationalism has often been correlated with the rise and fall of 
commodity prices—when prices fall, governments tend to loosen their fiscal 
regimes in an effort to encourage foreign domestic investment, but, in boom times, 
governments then demand a bigger slice of the pie—resource nationalism is now 
on the rise even when commodity prices are slipping. Where once expropriatory 
acts may have been driven by purely nationalistic policies that appeased the 
electorate, the resurgent resource nationalism of the 21st century now has wider 
political and social drivers in addition to the traditional economic ones.22 
Many resource-rich developing nations aspire to emulate China, and 
other successful emerging economies, based on what they have seen them 
achieve.23 Even if they cannot mimic China’s manufacturing-led 
transformation or India’s service-led transformation, they “believe that the 
development and exploitation of their nation’s minerals should be undertaken 
in such a way as to result in broader development in their nation, and that the 
mining enterprise should be shaped and subject to terms reflecting that. They 
seek resources-led transformation.”24 
These countries see the exploitation of natural resources as “a one-time 
economic opportunity to catalyze wider development”; hence, the 
expectation that mining projects should contribute to “economic 
development and the satisfaction of current national constituencies and of 
future generations.”25 It is also rooted in a conviction that “past mineral 
developments have given a disproportionate benefit to mining companies and 
to consumers, and that if foreigners wish to invest in the resources of the 
mineral-rich nations, then they must do so in ways which bring maximum 
benefit to the local population.”26 
For mining companies, “the robustness of their agreements,” and “their 
ability to defend their rights before an independent judiciary,” is of 
                                                                                                                           
 
20 Resource Nationalism, supra note 3. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Frilet & Haddow, supra note 1, at 469. 
24 Id. at 469–70. 
25 Id. 
26 Humphreys, supra note 5, at 20. 
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paramount importance.27 For them, the greatest concern is an “obsolescing 
bargain,” whereby a company invests in a project based on an agreement, 
with the expectation that the terms of the agreement have been hashed out 
with a host government, “only to be forced into a renegotiation on the terms 
of the agreement after the investment has been committed.”28 
Therefore, mining companies need to ensure from the beginning that 
projects are structured in such a way as to give locals a lasting self-interest 
in the success of the operations, including, if required, through “direct share-
holdings.”29 Mining companies need to structure their arrangement pursuant 
to “the requirements of the individual country and to the particular 
expectations and priorities of its people.”30 Through demonstrating a clear 
understanding of the potential economic impacts their operations will have, 
threats posed by the “resource curse,” and a commitment to work with local 
institutions towards realizing the full development benefits and mitigating 
the negative effects, mining companies can succeed in persuading local 
institutions that their needs will be better met through working with them 
than by “insisting that local or state companies undertake all mining 
activity.”31 
In the case of Mongolia, in September 2011, the Mongolian government 
sought to increase its stake in the project from 34% to 50% through 
renegotiations.32 The government has since reaffirmed the original agreement 
stating that an increase can only take place in 2040, once the investors have 
recouped their initial investment.33 The Mongolian government engaged in 
such conduct “following the election of the Mongolian People’s 
Revolutionary Party which placed a higher priority on developing 
Mongolia’s mineral resources and reopening negotiations with the mine 
operators.”34 Moreover, to highlight how much Mongolia wants a bigger 
slice of the mine, in an interview from 2011, then Executive Director of Oyu 
                                                                                                                           
 
27 Id. at 14. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 20. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Brenda Bouw, Mongolia Wants Bigger Stake in Massive Ivanhoe Copper Mine, GLOBE AND 
MAIL (Sept. 25, 2011), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/ 
mongolia-wants-bigger-stake-in-massive-ivanhoe-copper-mine/article595583/. 
33 Id. 
34 Resource Nationalism, supra note 3, at 9. 
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Tolgoi, LLC, Tserenbat Sedvanchig, said that the government of Mongolia 
regarded the investment agreement signed in October 2009, and capital 
expenditure, as two of its biggest issues.35 He added that the government of 
Mongolia also had qualms with the company’s “cost overruns, the funding 
and feasibility study for a $5 billion phase 2 underground expansion, the 
employment and pay of Mongolian workers, contractors and corporate 
governance, taxation, and the repatriation of earnings.”36 
II. PPP 
Given the differing expectations of host countries and investors today,37 
to address the modern realities, Marc Frilet and Ken Haddow favor use of the 
PPP model over the traditional approach to creating a durable mining 
agreement.38 
Frilet and Haddow think that the traditional approach, in its attempt to 
capture the essence of the agreement in detailed clauses, is static and “does 
not necessarily reflect the modern socio-political and geopolitical context” 
which is “continually evolving amidst the changing global economic 
balance.”39 Its failure stems from its rootedness at a fixed point in time; thus, 
they believe the traditional approach will not produce a durable contract. 
On the other hand, a successful PPP agreement will “balance investor 
concerns with modern and evolving socio-economic and socio-political 
dynamics, while avoiding the hazards of too loose or too constraining an 
agreement.”40 With the ultimate goal of creating an agreement that 
“minimizes the possibility of disruptive future renegotiations that are costly 
for all concerned,”41 the agreement will delineate, at the outset, “the 
objectives and the fundamental rights and the obligations of both parties, 
including the key economic standards and ratios.”42 More than a simple 
                                                                                                                           
 
35 Frik Els, Mongolia Still Has ‘22 Points of Dispute’ with Rio Tinto over Oyu Tolgoi, MINING.COM, 
July 17, 2013, http://www.mining.com/mongolia-still-has-22-points-of-dispute-with-rio-tinto-over-oyu-
tolgoi-48895/. 
36 Id. 
37 Frilet & Haddow, supra note 1, at 471. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 472. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 473. 
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“whereas” clause, the goal is “to provide an objective statement of the 
purpose of the agreement—indeed, of the whole enterprise the agreement 
facilitates—such that the legal mechanics of the agreement terms can be 
created and implemented from the substance of the objectives.”43 In the event 
there is a fundamental change in the future, “based on quite simple and well-
tested mechanics embedded in the agreement, detailed terms can be adjusted 
to reflect the founding objectives of the parties, and thus re-establish the 
overall contractual equilibrium in line with the objectives.”44 Thus, through 
such an approach, the agreement is made more durable, and is subjected to 
lower risks than “a more traditional agreement constrained by its detailed 
clauses defined at a fixed point in time.”45 
Before proceeding further, it would be useful to define Public-Private-
Partnership (PPP) and how it has been employed by some countries. But 
more importantly, rather than analyzing the durability of the Oyu Tolgoi 
mining agreement under a PPP construct, this note contemplates whether 
restructuring the Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement under a PPP construct 
could resolve the resource nationalism problem impeding its performance. 
A. PPP Definition 
The Federal Highway Administration defines a PPP as “any scenario 
under which the private sector assumes a greater role in the planning, 
financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of a 
transportation facility compared to traditional procurement methods.”46 
While this definition is expansive, the overarching goal of all PPPs is to 
capitalize on the private sector’s management skills, expertise, innovations, 
and efficiencies.47 PPPs can be classified based on a set of general 
characteristics, including: (1) “cooperation between the public and private 
sectors on different aspects of the planned project”; (2) “a relatively long-
                                                                                                                           
 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-44, HIGHWAY PUBLIC-PRIVATE-
PARTNERSHIPS: MORE RIGOROUS UP-FRONT ANALYSIS COULD BETTER SECURE POTENTIAL BENEFITS 
AND PROTECT THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3 (2008). 
47 Kathy Sharp et al., Public Private Partnerships: Evolutions in the U.S. Procurement System and 
Lessons Learned from the UK and the EU, 2 INT’L GOV’T CONTRACTOR 1 (2005). 
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term relationship” between the public and private partners; (3) “project 
funding that comes either partially or entirely from the private sector”; (4) a 
public focus on defining the objectives and goals of the project and 
monitoring compliance with these objectives, and a private focus on the 
design, completion, implementation, and funding of the project; and (5) “the 
transfer of some risks traditionally placed on the public sector to the private 
partner.”48 Accordingly, PPPs provide certain assets that governments often 
lack, such as full financial resources and expertise, and, as a consequence, 
governments look to the private sector to assist in developing infrastructure, 
among other important public projects. 
PPP projects differ from traditional procurement contracts in several 
respects. “They are typically large, long-term endeavors over which the 
private partner holds a significant amount of control and inherits greater 
risk.”49 Additionally: 
There are many public benefits to transferring the risk infrastructure development 
to the private sector. Most importantly, the public gains an infrastructure asset, 
which can lead to growth and prosperity without taking on debt. Governments can 
free up capital to pursue projects that have high social benefits but are otherwise 
unprofitable and therefore unattractive to the private sector. Transferring risk also 
allows governments to tap private expertise and can lead to efficiency gains. The 
private sector is incentivized to reduce costs and increase efficiencies in order to 
maximize profits. On the whole, the cost over the life of the infrastructure asset 
can be cheaper than the traditional procurement model because the design, 
building, management, and maintenance are often bundled.50 
Some of the other benefits include infusion of capital into the target market, 
creation of local jobs, spur of consumption, increase in wealth, and the 
promotion of stronger economies.51 
                                                                                                                           
 
48 Id. 
49 Vincent Napoleon et al., The Use of Public-Private Partnerships as a Model for the Delivery of 
Goods and Services to the Government—Is this a New Concept in Government Contracting?, 35 J.L. & 
COM. 119, 122 (2017). 
50 Andrew Hill, Foreign Infrastructure Investment in Chile: The Success of Public-Private 
Partnerships through Concessions Contracts, 32 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 165, 172 (2011). 
51 See Napoleon et al., supra note 49, at 122. 
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B. Common PPP Structures 
i. Build-Own-Transfer (BOT) 
“A build-own-transfer (BOT) arrangement is an agreement in which a 
private investor obtains funding for a public infrastructure project, builds the 
facility or project, and owns and operates the project for a period of time 
specified in the concession contract” to realize a reasonable return on its 
investments.52 At the end of this period, ownership of the facility or project 
reverts to the public sector.53 “The agreement can terminate either after a set 
period of time or when the initial investment plus an agreed-upon return on 
the investment has been repaid.”54 
ii. Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO) 
A build-transfer-operate (BTO) arrangement is similar to a BOT, but 
ownership of the infrastructure is transferred to the public sector upon the 
completion of the construction.55 
iii. Operations and Maintenance, and Management (OMM) 
“Under an Operations and Maintenance (“OM”) arrangement, a public 
partner contracts with a private partner to provide and/or maintain an already 
existing service.”56 Under this arrangement, while the public partner retains 
ownership and overall management of the service, the day-to-day 
management rests with the private partner.57 Furthermore, an OM 
arrangement typically lasts 3–5 years and offers relatively little revenue risk 
for the private partner.58 “An Operations, Maintenance, and Management 
(‘OMM’) project is typically the same as the OM model, however, OMMs 
                                                                                                                           
 
52 David W. Gaffey, Outsourcing Infrastructure: Expanding the Use of Public-Private Partnerships 
In the United States, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 351, 353 (2010). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Types of Partnerships, NAT’L COUNCIL FOR PUB.-PRIV. PARTNERSHIPS, http://www.ncppp.org/ 
ppp-basics/types-of-partnerships/. 
56 Napoleon et al., supra note 49, at 128. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
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have longer term projects that provide private partners more time and 
opportunity to make their own capital investments and earn reasonable 
returns.”59 
iv. Design-Build-Operate (DBO) 
“In a Design-Build-Operate (‘DBO’) project, a single contract is 
awarded to a private contractor to design, construct, and operate a new 
project until a contractually-agreed output, while the public sector maintains 
ownership and finances the project.”60 By holding one private entity 
accountable for multiple stages of a project, this arrangement reduces the risk 
of oversight on the part of the public sector had each stage been contracted 
out individually.61 
v. Concession 
A concession PPP is similar to a BOT, except it “can cover either an 
existing infrastructure or nonexistent, new project.”62 Furthermore, under a 
concession PPP, the public sector partner leases the infrastructure to a private 
investor for an upfront payment, “which the public sector partner will use to 
invest in other projects and which the private partner will presumably recover 
through the collection of tolls paid by people using the road,” in the case of 
a toll road.63 
C. The Use of PPPs in the UK and Chile 
The United Kingdom (UK) provides one of the most notable examples 
of the widespread and successful implementation of PPPs. The private 
finance initiative (PFI), introduced in 1992, to upgrade public infrastructure 
such as schools, hospitals, roads, and other public facilities without 
burdening the UK treasury, was hugely successful.64 “Between 1992 and 
                                                                                                                           
 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 129. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 126. 
63 Id. 
64 Gaffey, supra note 52, at 361. 
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2008 the United Kingdom instituted over 700 PFI projects, and plans to 
implement over 200 more projects worth over $400 billion” between 2008-
2013.65 
In response to the delays and inefficiencies that PFIs suffered early on, 
stemming “from a general lack of ability among public sector employees 
either to oversee the complex contracting process required for PPPs or to 
understand and manage the private business aspects of the agreement,”66 in 
1999, the UK government created a “permanent, quasi-governmental 
organization specializing in PPP projects,” called Partnerships UK.67 It is 
considered one of the most significant innovations of the PFI system.68 “This 
organization is comprised of board members from both the public and private 
sectors, who assist the UK treasury in developing and implementing PPPs, 
and assist the private sector in negotiating and performing such projects.”69 
The UK also introduced standardized contracts and supporting 
documents to simplify and ensure equity in the PPP implementation 
process.70 Designed to include “set terms that govern almost every aspect of 
the contract or eventuality that may arise during performance,”71 these 
comprehensive standardized contracts cover “the commencement of 
services, a change in services, a change in law, contract assignment, early 
termination, penalties for early termination, indemnities, insurance, the 
replacement of subcontractors, retendering following contractor default, and 
permitted borrowing and refinancing.”72 With the aim of enabling parties to 
undertake the implementation of PPPs easily, this semi-rigid form of contract 
was introduced to “reduce the negotiations needed to establish individual 
                                                                                                                           
 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 362. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. (“In addition to Partnerships UK, the UK also created purely governmental agencies tasked 
with overseeing PF projects. The National Audit Office (NAO) is the primary office responsible for 
overseeing the UK PFI program, while a Public Accounts Committee assists in the oversight and responds 
to reports issued by the NAO. A third agency, the Audit Commission, is responsible for auditing the public 
money spent by local officials on PFI projects.”). 
70 Id. at 364. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
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contracts and to assist in creating a business culture well versed in the terms 
and opportunities to be found in PPPs.”73 
Another country that has also had success with PPPs is Chile, 
specifically in the area of toll road concession.74 As the sole provider of 
infrastructure through the 1970s, to combat the rising infrastructure debts,75 
the Chilean government initially, in the 1980s, turned to privatization, 
whereby it sold many of the state-run infrastructure companies to private 
buyers.76 However, when that did not resolve the problem, and by 1990, 
struggling to “keep pace with the growing burdens placed on its 
infrastructure,” the government created a PPP concession program to rebuild 
and improve the nation’s highways.77 
The strong regulatory framework, comprising sound concessions and 
investment laws, in Chile significantly contributed to the country’s success 
with PPPs.78 “The first concessions law was approved in 1991 (the “1991 
law”), establishing the framework for private sector participation.”79 “It set 
the general standards for the execution, operation, and maintenance of public 
works, as well as for bids for public works contracts.”80 The 1991 law not 
only empowered the Minister of Public Works, it also prescribed terms 
pertaining to concessions contracts. “The legislation created a system of 
competitive bidding based on flexible arrangements for awarding 
concessions, establishing mutual rights and obligations, and setting up 
conflict resolution procedures. It also provided for the use of incentives, 
including subsidies and government guarantees to promote private 
investments.”81 
The Ministry of Public Works oversees the entire concessions system, 
and it is in charge of tendering the projects, controlling the bidding process, 
and supervising the construction and operation of the projects.82 Between 
                                                                                                                           
 
73 Id. 
74 Hill, supra note 50, at 173. 
75 Id. at 174. 
76 Id. at 175. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 176. 
79 Id. at 175. 
80 Id. at 177. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 175. 
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1995 (when the first PPP infrastructure project was completed)83 and 2008, 
“55 concession contracts were awarded, representing a total investment in 
infrastructure of close to $11.5 billion . . . [and] . . . 120 private companies 
have participated in projects ranging from $8 million to $850 million in 
value.”84 While the Chilean government initially employed the concessions 
system to address the lagging transportation infrastructure, between 2003 and 
2010, it used concessions to build airports, seaports, roads, and prisons; 
indications that the government has employed it for other uses.85 
An additional reason why Chile has had success with PPPs is due to the 
sound investment laws it passed to provide strong legal protection to both 
foreign investors and nationals alike.86 Buttressed by Chile’s Political 
Constitution, which provides protection to foreign investment,87 foreign 
investors who wish to invest in Chile can do so through two mechanisms: 
“under the general rules for foreign exchange found in Chapter XIV of the 
Central Bank’s Compendium of Foreign Exchange Regulations (CFER), or 
through the Foreign Investment Statue Decree Law No. 600 (DL 600).”88 
Most large foreign investors opt for DL 600,89 as seen by the more than 81% 
of all foreign direct investment entering Chile between 1990 and 2004.90 
“Under DL 600, investors have the right to enter into investment contracts 
with the Chilean government, to freely invest in all sectors of the economy, 
and to appeal any judicial rulings that may be discriminatory.”91 The National 
Congress of Chile promulgated DL 600 to govern the influx of foreign 
capital, and to provide equal legal treatment to both its nationals and foreign 
investors.92 
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III. OYU TOLGOI MINE 
Oyu Tolgoi is one of the world’s largest copper-gold mines, and is 
located in the South Gobi region of Mongolia, approximately 550 kilometers 
south of the capital, Ulaanbaatar, and 80 kilometers north of the Mongolia-
China border.93 The Oyu Tolgoi mine, which is a “part of one of the world’s 
largest known porphyry deposit systems in terms of reserves and resources, 
has total estimated copper reserves of 13.1 million metric tons (Mt), and 
about 1 million kilograms (kg) of gold.”94 “Estimated resources (including 
indicated and inferred resources) accounted for about another 14 Mt of 
copper95 and more than 400,000 kg of gold.”96 Production began in 2013, and 
“is expected to reach full capacity by 2018 with copper ore output potentially 
composing 3% of total world output, and revenue from the mine expected to 
represent as much as 34% of Mongolian GDP by then.”97 When fully 
operational, “the mine is set to produce more than 1.2 billion pounds of 
copper (worth over $4 billion at today’s prices), 650,000 ounces of gold 
($800 million), and 3 million ounces of silver (under $100 million) each 
year.”98 
On October 6, 2009, Turquoise Hill Resources and Rio Tinto signed a 
long-term comprehensive investment agreement with the government of 
Mongolia, for the construction and operation of the Oyu Tolgoi copper-gold 
mining complex.99 The agreement created a partnership between the 
Mongolian government, which acquired a 34%100 interest in the project, and 
Turquoise Hill Resources, which retained a controlling 66% interest in Oyu 
Tolgoi.101 Global miner, Rio Tinto, who joined Turquoise Hill Resources as 
                                                                                                                           
 
93 About Us, OYU TOLGOI, http://ot.mn/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2017). 
94 Wacaster, supra note 8, at 17.1. 
95 Id. 
96 See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 11 (Oyu Tolgoi is estimated to contain 45.032 million tons of 
copper; 157,000 tons of molybdenum; 12,049 tons of silver; 1,838 tons of gold). 
97 Khan, supra note 9. 
98 Els, supra note 35. 
99 See INVESTMENT AGREEMENT SUMMARY, supra note 10. 
100 ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 11, at 6. 
101 INVESTMENT AGREEMENT SUMMARY, supra note 10. 
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a strategic partner in October 2006, is managing the development of Oyu 
Tolgoi.102 
Disagreements between the Mongolian government and Rio Tinto came 
to a head in 2013, with the government urging Rio Tinto to settle a 340 
million dollar tax issue. Additionally, the cost of the project was initially 
projected to be $5.1 billion dollars, but went up to $7.1 billion dollars during 
the initial stage of the project.103 In July 2013, shares in Turquoise Hill 
Resources dropped 20% after a dispute between Tserenbat Sedvanchig, the 
executive director of Erdenes Oyu Tolgoi,104 and Rio Tinto.105 Sedvanchig 
was fired in August, and replaced by Davaadorj Ganbold, a former deputy 
minister and Member of Parliament.106 In the meantime, Rio Tinto cut 1,700 
Mongolian employees from the mining operation.107 
A. Environmental Impact 
Rio Tinto has a poor record of environmental management; a number of 
its mines, including Oyu Tolgoi, are routinely criticized by prominent 
international environmental groups.108 The Oyu Tolgoi mine is located in one 
of the driest areas in Mongolia.109 Rainfall in the desert area ranges between 
zero and 50 millimeters per year.110 It is estimated that the water demand will 
triple in the coming two decades, due mainly to mineral exploitation in the 
                                                                                                                           
 
102 Oyu Tolgoi, RIO TINTO, http://www.riotinto.com/copperanddiamonds/oyu-tolgoi-4025.aspx. 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2016). 
103 Robb M. Stewart, Rio Tinto to Cut 1,700 Jobs at Oyu Tolgoi Mine, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2013), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323639704579014201657311552. 
104 The Mongolian Government owns its interest through a state-owned company called Erdenes 
Oyu Tolgoi. 
105 Michael Kohn, Oyu Tolgoi LLC Executive Director Fired Following Rio Dispute, BLOOMBERG 
(Aug. 19, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08-19/oyu-tolgoi-llc-executive-
director-fired-following-rio-dispute. 
106 Id. 
107 Stewart, supra note 103. 
108 Keith Schneider, Mongolia Copper Mine at Oyu Tolgoi Tests Water Supply and Young 
Democracy, CIRCLE BLUE (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.circleofblue.org/2013/world/mongolia-copper-
mine-oyu-tolgoi-tests-water-supply-young-democracy/. 
109 Id. 
110 Oliver Balch, Mongolia’s Water Scarcity Could Threaten its Economic Boom, THE GUARDIAN 
(Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/mongolia-water-scarcity-threaten-
economic-boom-mining. 
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area.111 Leaders worry that Oyu Tolgoi is draining the region’s water supply, 
since it uses more than a billion gallons of water per month.112 In addition, 
there is a substantial risk of acid rock drainage from the mine, caused by 
tailings storage facilities, and any overburden or waste rock stored on the 
surface and not deposited back into the mine.113 
South Gobi is also a critical habitat for at least six endangered and 
threatened species, found nowhere else in the world.114 They are the 
Mongolian Wild Ass-Khulan (Equus hemionus—threatened), Goitered 
(Black-tail) Gazelle (Gazella subgutturosa—vulnerable), Mongolian Gazelle 
(Procapra gutturosa—near threatened), Houbara Bustard (Chlamydotis 
undulate—vulnerable), and Saker Falcon (Flaco Cherrug—endangered).115 
Two protected areas, the Small Gobi Strictly Protected Area A (SGA), and 
the Small Gobi Strictly Protected Area B (SGB), are located in close 
proximity to Oyu Tolgoi, and are included in the mine’s area of impact.116 In 
order to compensate for the loss of habitat, Oyu Tolgoi, LLC, the Rio 
Tinto/Turquoise Hill subsidiary that manages the mine, released a 
biodiversity offset strategy; however, the NGOs are not convinced.117 They 
stress that Oyu Tolgoi, LLC did not consider avoiding, minimizing or 
mitigating the damage, and went directly to offsetting. They urge the 
company to develop a strong, detailed, long-term species conservation and 
habitat protection plan that includes a rigorous monitoring strategy.118 They 
view the current mitigation strategies described in the ESIA as too general 
and not based on empirical data, calling the offset strategy into question.119 
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112 Schneider, supra note 108. 
113 ROBERT GOODLAND, MONGOLIA: THE OYU TOLGOI COPPER & GOLD MINE PROJECT: 
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TRIP REPORT 6 (2011). 
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117 A USELESS SHAM (A REVIEW OF THE OYU TOLGOI COPPER/GOLD MINE ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
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B. Social Impact 
Mongolia’s southern and central zones occupy terrain traditionally used 
by nomadic herdsmen. Diverting already scarce water resources to mining 
could jeopardize their livelihoods.120 In the harsh conditions of the Gobi 
Desert, herders have a very specific way of organizing summer pasture, its 
rotation, access to water, hay collection, and hay storage. Any changes to 
these unique practices could hamper the livelihoods of nomads.121 Steel fence 
that surrounds the gaping mine blocks traditional herding corridors, and 
makes it difficult for the herd animals to find water. Roads constructed by 
the mine owners present also additional barriers to animals.122 
Some Mongolian herders forced to resettle because of the Oyu Tolgoi 
expansion have already experienced herd loss. They were forced to move to 
inferior locations, without adequate time to select spots that would protect 
their animals from harsh winter storms. The minimal assistance provided at 
the time of resettlement was not sufficient.123 Furthermore, they were forced 
to accept inadequate compensation based on their location in proximity to the 
mine, rather than the size of pasture taken away from them.124 
C. Economic Impact 
Mining in Mongolia currently contributes about one third to the nation’s 
GDP, and accounts for 89.2% of the country’s total exports.125 Building an 
economy on minerals puts a country at risk of Dutch disease, a term used to 
describe the relationship between the increase in the economic development 
of natural resources, and a decline in the manufacturing sector or 
agriculture.126 The cashmere industry and the agricultural sector are already 
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(Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.eurasianet.org/node/67372. 
126 Id. 
94 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 36:77 
 
Vol. 36, No. 1 (2017) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2017.130 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
feeling the side effects.127 Although Mongolia’s economic growth has helped 
to reduce poverty by more than 11% in recent years, income distribution 
inequality has also risen. “Poverty is higher in the rural areas (35.5%) 
compared to the urban areas (23.2%), as herders in the countryside struggle 
to survive as their traditional livelihood dissolves.”128 
D. Corruption Related Issues 
Gantömöriin Uyanga, a Member of Parliament has announced that 
former Prime Minister, Sanjaagiin Bayar, who signed the Oyu Tolgoi (OT) 
Investment Agreement with three of his cabinet members, owns several 
properties abroad worth several billion dollars.129 However, Bayar has 
approached the Independent Agency Against Corruption with a request to 
conduct an investigation on himself.130 Also Sangijav Bayartsogt, the former 
Deputy Speaker of Parliament, and one of the three ministers who signed the 
OT agreement, has had his secret offshore account revealed by “The 
Guardian,” a British Newspaper.131 According to the report, Bayartsogt 
confirmed that he maintained a secret Swiss bank account containing more 
than one million US dollars, in the name of an offshore entity “Legend Plus 
Capital Limited.”132 
IV. PPP APPLIED TO OYU TOLGOI 
Borrowing lessons from the Chilean and UK success stories, at the 
outset, Mongolia currently has in place a favorable Investment and PPP 
framework. While a handful of laws that govern capital raising for mining 
activities still remain in Mongolia, the legal framework has been transformed 
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through the repeal of previous laws, enactment of new legislation, and 
amendments to existing statutes. Notably, the Law on the Regulation of 
Foreign Investment in Entities Operating in Strategic Sectors (SEFIL) had 
been controversial since its passing in 2012, and was observed to be 
problematic in encouraging foreign investment in Mongolia.133 SEFIL has 
now been repealed, and the country’s newly-drafted Investment Law has 
replaced both the Foreign Investment Law and SEFIL.134 The new 
Investment Law “streamlined the registration process for foreign-invested 
entities, relaxed restrictions on investment by foreign state-owned entitles, 
and provided for the Ministry of Economic Development’s creation of the 
Invest Mongolia Agency (IMA) ‘to promote, advertise and regulate 
investment activities in Mongolia.’”135 
“The wider framework for PPPs is provided by the Constitution of 
Mongolia, the Law on Government, the Civil Code, the Law on State and 
Local Property, the Law on Investment, and the Integrated Budget Law.”136 
Parliament adopted the State Policy on PPP in 2009 to promote private sector 
participation in all areas of the national economy, and in 2010 adopted the 
Law on Concession, which defines all processes of PPP implementation.137 
“The Comprehensive National Development Strategy, adopted in 2008, 
identified PPPs as a potential mechanism to mobilize the private sector’s 
contribution.”138 PPP responsibilities fall under the Ministry of Industry. This 
role was shifted from the State Property Committee to the Ministry of 
Economic Development (MED) in 2012, and then to the Ministry of Industry, 
where it rests now. Since the Law on Concessions was introduced in 2010, 
Mongolia’s PPP Unit has expanded the regulatory framework, and gained 
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significant project experience.139 Under the new government, the PPP unit is 
now housed under a new National Development Agency (NDA).140 
As stated at the outset, the government of Mongolia entered into a joint-
venture with Ivanhoe Mines to develop the Oyu Tolgoi mine when it signed 
the Investment Agreement in 2009, thereby owning 34% of the shares. After 
the government’s failed attempt to increase its share to 50% in 2011, it is 
unlikely that Mongolia will be able to increase its share in the near term.141 
The Mongolian government could have been far better off had it entered into 
a PPP agreement with Ivanhoe Mines in the beginning, Mongolia Mining 
Law permitting. 
Under a BTO PPP, the Mongolian government would have retained full 
ownership of the Oyu Tolgoi mine. As defined earlier, under the BTO 
arrangement, ownership of the infrastructure is transferred to the public 
sector upon the completion of the construction. In this case, had Ivanhoe 
Mines or Rio Tinto agreed to a BTO arrangement, upon the construction of 
the Oyu Tolgoi mine, they would have transferred ownership of the mine 
back to the government of Mongolia, staving off a potential serious concern 
raised by leasing the mine once construction is completed. 
As the quantity of minerals at Oyu Tolgoi is finite, a potential major 
concern for the Mongolian government is permitting the private partner to 
operate the facility for a long period of time, once construction is completed. 
Given its modern and advanced technology, a global miner, such as Rio 
Tinto, could easily extract most of the minerals within a short period of time; 
thereby, foreclosing the possibility for the Mongolian government to operate 
and benefit from the Oyu Tolgoi mine once control reverts back to the public 
sector. The same problem arises under a short-term scenario. This problem 
could be resolved through close and regular governmental monitoring of the 
amounts extracted from the site, but this approach is not foolproof. Would 
the Mongolian government be willing to incur a significant expense in 
measuring everything that is being mined out of Oyu Tolgoi during the lease? 
Or will it have to rely on the timely reports prepared by Rio Tinto that can be 
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susceptible to reporting inaccuracies? Even if there is close monitoring, Rio 
Tinto could either willfully or mistakenly underreport the amount it is 
extracting from the Oyu Tolgoi mine, thereby harming the Mongolian 
government. 
Another benefit flowing from the BTO arrangement is the 
approximately $2.3 billion in public debt (out of the near 7 billion spent on 
the development of the open-pit mine) that the government of Mongolia has 
incurred due to its 34% share ownership under the existing Investment 
Agreement, from which it could have avoided liability.142 A BTO would have 
freed up the $2.3 billion, which the government of Mongolia could have 
invested in other sectors. Mongolia, with its current focus on mineral 
extraction to produce economic growth, is already suffering from a condition 
known as Dutch disease, i.e. overdependence on the development and sale of 
natural resources, which has hindered its efforts to promote inclusive growth, 
and dampened its ability to resolve issues like severe poverty and inequality. 
The World Bank defines inclusive growth as “being broad-based across 
(economic) sectors and inclusive of the large part of the country’s labor 
force.”143 “According to data collected by the Oxford Business Group in 
2012, although mining was responsible for about a third of GDP, the industry 
only employed 5% of the Mongolian workforce.”144 Contrast this with the 
traditional pastoral herding sector, which produced less than 15% of the 
GDP, but employed about 40% of the workforce.145 The government of 
Mongolia could have invested $2.3 billion into the traditional pastoral 
herding or agricultural sectors, thereby strengthening those sectors, 
employing a greater share of the workforce, and further reducing severe 
poverty and inequality. 
Several issues arise with the use of BTO structure. A major issue is 
whether Rio Tinto would be interested in a BTO PPP arrangement from the 
beginning. If global miners, like Rio Tinto, see the value behind Oyu Tolgoi, 
they want to stay in the business as long as possible to maximize profit. As 
of December 2015, according to Rio Tinto, some $6.4 billion has been 
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invested to develop the open-pit mine at Oyu Tolgoi, with an additional $500 
million of capital costs for initial development of the underground mine.146 
Oyu Tolgoi is seeking to raise up to $6 billion of limited recourse project 
finance to refinance existing shareholder funding, and support development 
of the underground phase.147 Assuming, arguendo, that the combined total 
construction cost of both the open-pit and underground mining averages 
around $15 billion, a concession and OMM type arrangements would permit 
Rio Tinto to realize reasonable returns on its investment, after control of the 
mine reverts back to the government of Mongolia under a BTO arrangement. 
The concession structure can cover an existing asset or utility. In return for 
an upfront payment (in this case the $15 billion investment), under a 
concession PPP arrangement, the government of Mongolia leases Oyu Tolgoi 
to Rio Tinto for a set number of years to recover its initial investment, and 
earn some agreed-upon profit. Under an OMM, as already explained, the 
public partner provides the service, while day-to-day management rests with 
the private sector. Should the government of Mongolia have the capability to 
mine and export minerals which will be addressed below, and should a global 
miner like Rio Tinto be interested in managing the day-to-day operations, an 
OMM arrangement could be an attractive option to Rio Tinto. 
Assuming that Rio Tinto transfers the Oyu Tolgoi mine back to the 
government of Mongolia, another issue is whether the Mongolian 
government would possess the capacity and know-how to operate it 
effectively on its own. This problem can be easily resolved. As Rio Tinto is 
already investing in education, and technical and vocational training, to 
develop a Mongolian work force to run the mine,148 the government of 
Mongolia should continue this practice. As always, risk transfer to the private 
sector, and cost savings are major reasons why PPPs are attractive. It will be 
up to the government of Mongolia to decide how to proceed. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
At least for the foreseeable term, the government of Mongolia is stuck 
with its 34% share interest in the development of the Oyu Tolgoi mine, and 
it will be liable for the loans Rio Tinto borrows. Instead of agreeing to a joint-
venture, the Mongolian Mining Law permitting, had the government of 
Mongolia employed a private-public-partnership to develop the Oyu Tolgoi 
mine, the outcome would have been different, and the Mongolian people 
could have been far better off. While still retaining public ownership of the 
Oyu Tolgoi mine, the government of Mongolia could have used the BTO 
structure to develop the mine, and once Rio Tinto transfers ownership back 
to it, it could have either employed the Concession, OMM, or PPP structures 
to operate the mine, while cultivating and training the future Mongolian 
mining labor force. Or it could continue to employ the two PPP arrangements 
(concession and OMM), laid out above, to keep public spending low, and use 
the money from concessions arrangement to invest in other areas to further 
promote the economy, and reduce poverty. 
